Francis Collins, director of the Human Genome Research Institute, recently spoke about the relationship between science and faith. A summary of his talk can be found here. Dr. Collins’ touched on many issues, including Intelligent Design.

Dr. Collins repeats the idea that the “term theory is not used by scientists the same way it is used colloquially (as an unsupported hunch or hypothesis) but is instead a unifying principle that explains a whole host of observations.” But I am afraid this is wrong, as I demonstrated here.

Then things get much more interesting. Collins notes there are five ways to approach the relationship between science and faith. He cites them as 1) athiesm; 2) agnosticism; 3) creationism; 4) intelligent design and; 5) theistic evolution. What is encouraging is that Francis Collins kinda gets it – intelligent design is NOT creationism. It does indeed deserve to be in a category of its own.

Collins also acknowledges that there is an appealing aspect to ID:

One reason intelligent design is an appealing alternative, according to Collins, is that it is also a plausible explanation for genetic similarities. The Designer works up a DNA template for a turtle, for instance, and with some minor changes can create an alligator.

But he then goes on to explain how genomics has uncovered serious problems for ID:

He showed a hypothetical stretch of human DNA three genes (A, B, & C) and spacer regions between them, then the same three genes in the mouse. First, the genes are in the same order, as you would predict if they had a common ancestor. But, that is also consistent with design: perhaps those three genes work best together, so the designer put them there, Second, the coding regions (genes) are more homologous than the non-coding regions: exactly what evolution predicts, since the genes would be expected to be more resistant to change than non-coding regions. But again, that poses no special problem for design. Third, there is evidence “jumping genes” (or transposable elements); genes which jump and “land” and “get stuck” in the non-coding areas, often damaging themselves in the process, so they apparently are not coding for anything. Human and mouse also share these elements. This is harder to explain with design, but not impossible; perhaps this gene has a purpose not understood yet and therefore the designer had a reason for putting it there. Finally, however, Collins pointed to a transposable element that was “hopelessly damaged” and therefore could not possibly code for anything due to a lost (or truncated) element. The exact same letter was truncated in human and mouse. It is hard to see any design for this type of genetic evidence. It is, however, the exact thing a designer would put in the genome if he wanted to plant false evidence for common descent, perhaps to test the faith of the scientist. But Collins expressed doubts about a “charlatan” God that intentionally seeks to confuse us. A more reasonable explanation is that the mutation occurred in a common ancestor to mice and humans, some 80 million years ago. If so, you would expect to see this same element in many other mammals, and you do.

I find the above argument to be compelling. In fact, I made a similar argument before, but instead of using something as sexy as genes, I discussed something as mundane as the hair on your arms.

There are two points of interest that fall out of Collins’ analysis. First, pay attention to the importance of design-reasoning that runs throughout it all. When Collins points to the transposable element that was “hopelessly damaged” and “therefore could not possibly code for anything due to a lost(or truncated) element,” the significance of “the exact same letter” being truncated in human and mouse culminates in the following conclusion: “It is hard to see any design for this type of genetic evidence.” Indeed.

A crucial assumption in ID thinking is the acknowledgement that design exists for a reason. This is what makes design an inherently teleological process. If there is no function associated with the nucleotide sequence in question, then design is not indicated. Yet the similarity between man and mouse remains, thus indicating common descent.

It’s exactly as this point where we can see a very important point – considerations of intelligent design can very well be used to support an evolutionary interpretation over creationism. This should help some people to see the intellectual bankruptcy of those who still cling to the notion that ID = creationism.

The second point is even more interesting. Collins acknowledges the reasonable nature of the hypothesis of common design. It’s not until the common feature becomes demonstrably functionless that this hypothesis breaks down. But until that point is reached, common design is a reasonable alternative to common descent. What makes this all the more interesting is that because science does not consider intelligent design, it often leaps from similarities to common descent; the plausible teleological alternative is ruled out only by the game rules. And unfortunately for Collins’, he quickly forgets this point.

Later on in his presentation, Collins focuses more on ID:

This view is certainly appealing to believers as an alternative to evolution; the problem, Collins feels, is that it’s likely wrong. He cited the exampled of ID’s “poster child,” the bacterial flagellum as described by Behe. As we study more and more bacteria, it becomes more and more obvious that many of the 32 proteins that make up this “irreducibly complex” motor were recruited from other cellular components.

Why would Collins’ think that many flagellar proteins were recruited from other cellular components? Because a couple of flagellar proteins (more if you count the type III secretory system) are ‘homologous’ to other cellular components. But hold on! Collins has forgotten the appeal of common design. To declare similarities as homology would beg the question by a methodology that doesn’t even consider the possibility of common design.

And even if Collins were to come up with some independent evidence that made a compelling case for recruitment, this simply takes us into the realm of front-loaded evolution.

Collins was also reported to be concerned about the ID movement for a number of reasons.

1. First, it falsely insists that evolution is wrong. But this is not true. ID only attempts to find fingerprints of intelligent intervention amidst Nature. And this would include the phenomena of evolution itself.

2. Collins instead predicts that ID will be discredited within a fairly short time, as scientists come up with more and more evolutionary mechanisms to explain the existence of “irreducibly complex” structures. In that event, Christianity, not science, is what will look stupid. This is understandable concern, especially if ID is presented as a challenge to come up with an evolutionary mechanism. But be careful here. Explaining the existence of IC structures may simply amount to a simple story propped up with some circumstantial evidence. This would be called a working hypothesis and such a thing is a long, long way from a historical explanation.

3. Second, ID strikes him as a “defense” of God from Darwin’s theory, something Collins doesn’t think God needs. I agree with this sentiment. For me, ID is not about defending God from Darwin’s Theory or about replacing Darwin’s theory. It is about the sincere hunch that Darwin’s theory is incomplete and that some form of intelligent design plays a complementary role in natural history.