Intelligent Design Creationism

By Mike Gene

It's fairly safe to say that many (not all) critics of Intelligent Design are enslaved to stereotypes. While this may seem a provocative claim, it is merely an observation based on much experience and familiarity with a rather large sampling of ID critics. For example, witness the widespread attempt to label those who propose ID as "Intelligent Design Creationists." Is this a label that adds light to the discussion? Or is it a label that adds smoke and heat to the discussion? Experience dictates it is the latter.

What possible clarity does the term "Intelligent Design Creationism" bring to the table? As stated, "Intelligent Design" acts as an adjective that modifies the noun "Creationism." Yet as far as I know, all "Creationists" accept some kind of Intelligent Design, as all Creationists believe God is both "Intelligent" and the "Designer." So what use is the redundant adjective? Creationists accept ID. Is this significant? Are there Creationists who reject ID? Who are they?

Yet the inverse is not true. That is, not all Intelligent Design proponents are Creationists. Of course, this all turns on how we define "Creationist." One may attempt to define "Creationist" as anyone who believes Nature or Life or some form of Life was "created" rather than emerging from non-intelligent forces. If one waters down the definition in this way, they end up ensnaring various theistic evolutionists and proponents of directed panspermy (such as Francis Crick) in the category of "Creationist." Yet imagine the ICR put out a pamphlet stating, "Creationist Francis Crick (who helped discover the Double Helix nature of DNA) was so incredulous of abiogenesis that he proposed the first life forms were designed and deposited on this planet." I think it obvious those previously proposing the watered down definition would now accuse the ICR of misrepresenting Crick as a creationist, indicating that they really don't take their watered down definition seriously. Clearly, if the definition of "Creationist" can include a proponent of Darwinian evolution, then the definition adds smoke, not light, to the debate.

The main problem with the term of "Intelligent Design Creationist" is that it fails to understand the essence of human communication. Words usually have connotations that are not necessarily part of an abstract, idealized philosophical definition. Imagine President Bush labeled leaders of the Democratic Party, and the special interest groups that supported them, as "Communists." Bush would surely get into much trouble with this rhetoric. But what if he tried to defend such labels by citing the dictionary definition of a Communist as one who engages in left-wing activities? Obviously, this would look like the shallow excuse that it is. Yes, one can abstractly define a 'Communist' as a person who engages in left-wing activities, but we all know that the word 'Communist' carries many negative connotations in our society. It's an issue of communication, not definition. The same situation holds for those who peddle the term "Intelligent Design Creationism." They are engaged in rhetoric for socio-political, not intellectual, reasons.

Any argument is an attempt to communicate - to your opponent and to those watching the argument. Thus, if one uses the term "Creationist", they are communicating. But what are they communicating? The sterile, abstract, watered-down philosophical definition? Or the far more popular notion of a creationist as personified by such people as Henry Morris, Duane Gish and various members of the Religious Right? This is a question that could be studied and answered from a sociological point of view and I am quite confident that what is being communicated is the latter. After all, the watered-down definitions are typically idiosyncratic and depend on the person defining the term (for example, I have seen some watered-down definitions that include reference to the supernatural and others that don't).

Why do some critics of ID insist on employing such rhetoric? Why would someone insist on viewing this debate through the filters of the "Intelligent Design Creationism" label? For one thing, it emerges from and taps in to their stereotypes. Many ID critics have much previous experience arguing with Creationists and thus their experience has shaped and conditioned their perceptions. This then leads to the psychological phenomena of transference, where anyone arguing for ID is perceived through the impressions acquired previously by arguing with Creationists. What's more, many ID proponents are indeed Creationists, thus such acts of transference are bound to be positively reinforced.

Of course, the problem is that such experience with Creationism usually entails the interaction with a belief system that a) is strongly anti-evolution; b) proposes the Biblical God as the Creator; c) interprets Genesis in a literal fashion. Yet it is at these three points that ID can part company with Creationism. There is nothing intrinsic to ID that makes it "anti-evolution," as evolution may not only be factored into the Design, but it some ways, may itself be designed. There is nothing intrinsic to ID that equates the intelligence with God. A speculation that proposes ETI as the designer qualifies as an ID hypothesis. And, of course, nothing about Intelligent Design need involve the Book of Genesis, let alone a literal interpretation of Genesis. Yet these distinctions depend on logical thinking that is dampened by the dynamics of transference at play in the minds of those using the label. The label "Intelligent Design Creationist" adds confusion, not clarity, to the debate.

At this point, the critics of ID often attempt a sociological argument, pointing to the religious beliefs of those in the "ID Movement." This is a way to rationalize one's transference. The erroneous "guilt by association" argument is then used to paint any ID proponent in similar light. It is understandable why many ID critics would want to focus on the "movement," as the intellectual concept proposing that some aspect(s) of life are intelligently designed is much more difficult to oppose than erecting arguments that have the flavor of old fashioned conspiracy theories, complete with concerns about the "motivations" of the "ID Creationists." The bottom line is that many critics can't help but see ID as some form of Creationism, as their minds have been conditioned to do just this. It's really quite a shame, as it imposes a stifling, one-dimensional perspective on the rich diversity of human opinion.

Another dynamic involved in sociological. The label "Creationist" has come to carry a negative connotation, especially in academic environments. To deny this is to be irrational. When you apply the negative label to someone else, you are attempting to set the contextual stage of the debate by imposing the words "Dangerous Nonsense" as the descriptors of that person's position. It is a pure rhetorical move that poisons the well in a subtle, yet powerful way. Witness the manner in which talk radio show host, Rush Limbaugh, labels his opponents when disagreeing with their political views. Those who throw about the label, "Intelligent Design Creationism," are doing the same thing. Both employ such tactics to sway public opinion. The difference is that Limbaugh is an admitted entertainer with purely political goals, while those who use the "Creationist" label often posture as being serious and objective.

There is one good thing about the term "Intelligent Design Creationism." Those who use the term to make sense of this debate give themselves away as being biased and incapable of considering this debate objectively. When one relies on stereotypes to inform their opinions about issues, it is fairly safe to say that you are dealing with a mindset that thinks the issues have been resolved and we should move on to labeling and fighting people who got it wrong. After all, is it a coincidence that every one who uses the term "Intelligent Design Creationism" also just happens to think that ID is nonsense?

Addendum

I recall a psychology experiment from the 1970s, where two groups of observers watched a short film of a traffic accident. Group A was asked, "About how fast were the cars going when they hit each other?" Group B was asked, "About how fast were the cars going when they smashed into each other?" Group B estimated higher speeds than group A, apparently because the word "smash" affected how they recalled the film. A week later, both groups were asked if they had seen any broken glass from the accident (even though the accident did not result in any broken glass). Again, members of group B were twice as likely to "recall" seeing broken glass than members of group A, probably as a function of falsely remembering a more violent accident.

Another experiment from the 30s showed people a picture of two circles connected by a straight line. For group A, the picture came with the caption, "eye-glasses"; for group B, it came with the caption "dumb-bells." Later, they were asked to redraw what they saw. Instead of drawing two circles connected by a line, many members a group A drew eye-glasses and members of group B drew dumb-bells.

How we label things and how we describe things does shape our perceptions.

TeleoLogic